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I.

Introduction

A. Background
The War on Terror, known formally today as
the War Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates, premised
on upholding the values of freedom, integrity, and
democracy, has been tarnished by some of the most
abhorrent practices known to humankind. Among
such practices, torture remains at the forefront. While
numerous states continue to practice torture despite
their international obligations, nothing has been so
shocking, so damning, so alarming in the struggle
to eradicate torture than the graphic images of U.S.
run prisons and accounts provided by their detainees.
While we live in an era of the germinating phase of
ostensibly a “new” form of war-making where it is
unclear whether the laws of war apply, the fact that
the leading state of the free world has been able to
carry out tortuous practices contradicts the very
notion of a “war on terror.” For example, the U.S.
military had approved, among other forms of torture,
hooding, sleep deprivation, use of dogs, sensory
deprivation, nudity, and the placement of prisoners in
painful positions for extended periods.2 Prisoners also
complained in domestic federal court that American
soldiers had caused them severe physical pain that
sometimes resulted in permanent physical injury.3
Indeed, as one anonymous U.S. official stationed in
Afghanistan stated, if “you don’t violate someone’s
human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t
doing your job.”4 Torture has been prevalent not
only at detention centers in Iraq and Afghanistan,
but also in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where, according
to a 2003 report by the International Committee of
the Red Cross (“ICRC”), psychological and physical
coercion “tantamount to torture” was used on
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prisoners.5 Perhaps most controversially, the Central
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) has also admitted to its use
of the internationally banned practice of waterboarding.6
Rather than carrying out such activities in secret, the
United States crafted a painstakingly detailed account of
the law in the early stages of the conflict and used legal
acrobatics to overcome the barriers preventing torture.
The product of such efforts, known as the “torture
memos,”7 will be addressed throughout this paper. The
torture memos are a set of three legal memoranda drafted
by John Yoo in his position as Deputy Assistant Attorney
General of the United States, and signed by Assistant
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, head of the Office of
Legal Counsel of the United States Department of
Justice. They advised the presidential administration
that the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” such
as mental and physical torment and coercion, including
prolonged sleep deprivation, binding in stress positions,
and waterboarding might be legally permissible.8
These memos formed the backbone of the U.S. policy
regarding interrogations during the Bush era. The
United Nations Convention Against Torture, and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(“UN CAT”) and the Geneva Conventions stand out
among the barriers these memos sought to overcome.
Unlike the UN CAT, the language used in the Geneva
Conventions emphasizes an absolute prohibition on
physical pain. However, the Geneva Conventions apply
solely in situations of armed conflicts. For this reason,
to evade scrutiny through the lens of the Conventions,
the U.S. attempted to categorize the conflict as falling
outside both international armed conflicts (“IACs”)
and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), thus
precluding the application of Geneva law.
While much of the legal framework used to
justify torture within the United States is no longer
considered part of U.S. policy and the United States has
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since abandoned the practice of torture,9 there is still
merit in analyzing these policies as there are no safeguards
against a return to a torture regime, nor any recognition
that the “enhanced interrogation”10 used by the United
States during the past decade violated international
law.11 The War on Terror does not fit “neatly” within
the traditional types of armed conflict. Moreover, the
Secretary of Defense continues to hold the power to, if
he or she pleases, introduce evidence obtained through
torture in courts of law.12 This paper considers the
scope of international law in regulating non-traditional,
asymmetrical warfare and attempts to clarify the
misperceptions regarding application of international
legal instruments prohibiting torture to these conflicts.
B. Framework
While the era of torture seemingly ended with the
Bush Administration, it is clear that, without a fundamental
shift in the way that conflict is conceptualized, the existing
legal framework remains insufficient to prevent a future
American torture regime. The primary reasons for this are
the misunderstanding of the application of human rights
law during armed conflict and the misconceptualization
of the Geneva Conventions. To adequately preclude the
use of any form of torture during conflict, four important
statements regarding warfare and derived from customary
international law must be asserted. First, international
human rights law (“IHRL”) must apply co-extensively
with international humanitarian law (“IHL”) during
armed conflicts. Second, war must exist within the
confines of temporal and spatial boundaries at all times.
Third, transnational actors including terrorist groups
may not be considered combatants outside of traditional
armed conflicts, Finally, within armed conflict, there is
no detainee “twilight zone” in the Geneva Conventions.
The adoption of these maxims offers greater permanence
than does the change in policy from one presidential
administration to the next.
This paper is divided into six parts. Part II
will consider the applicability of international human
rights law instruments during warfare, particularly the
United Nations Convention Against Torture. Part III
will demonstrate how political rhetoric has been used to
eradicate the temporal boundary of war. Warfare requires
the existence of a possible end-point, and the dissolution
of this end-point antagonizes compliance with Geneva
Law. Part IV argues that the supposed non-existence of
spatial boundaries during warfare, an argument crafted
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by U.S. legal rhetoric, is incorrect. A correct geographical
framework of the Law of Armed Conflict will be put
forward, and outside of these boundaries, terrorism must
be neutralized through law enforcement. From this, Part V
notes that transnational terrorist organizations can never,
independent of other conflicts, be considered belligerent
forces with which a state may wage war for the purposes
of the Geneva Conventions. Finally, part VI argues that
there is no twilight zone in conflicts. Thus, individuals
who are detained receive protection under either the Third
or Fourth Geneva Convention and, ipso facto, always retain
protection from torture. This paper makes the following
overall conclusions: that (1) IHRL is co-extensive with IHL,
but is limited through the principle of military necessity; (2)
states must adhere to the temporal and spatial boundaries
of war, and avoid using rhetoric to derogate human rights;
(3) terrorists are never lawful combatants, and are only
unlawful combatant when directly participating in active
theaters of traditional wars; and (4) those persons within
such an armed conflict that do not qualify for POW status
must still be treated humanely in accordance with the
Third Geneva Convention.
II. The UN Convention Against Torture and its
Relationship to the Geneva Conventions
The United States has put forward two
arguments for finding that the UN CAT does not
apply during the War against Al Qaeda and its
affiliates. While this paper focuses predominantly on
the armed conflict paradigm, some discussion will
be dedicated to the UN CAT specifically because
this paper finds the UN CAT applies during armed
conflict situations as well, and thus the UN CAT is
therefore relevant to the present discussion. The UN
CAT is applicable to the prevention of torture in the
context of war because (1) the definition of torture
is not narrow enough to bar the US’s application of
physical abuse and (2) international human rights law
is co-extensive with the law of armed conflict; the two
sources of law are not mutually exclusive.
A. The Scope of “severe pain or suffering”
From the very start of the War on Terror, the
term “torture,” as applied in the UN CAT, was quickly
redefined by Department of Defense lawyers to read
the use of torture out of the law.13 While the UN CAT
addresses both torture and inhumane or degrading
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treatment, only torture is punishable.14 Consequently,
the U.S. has a strategic interest in narrowing the
scope of the convention so that it can engage in acts
that are otherwise generally understood to be torture.
Controversially, the torture memos found that to inflict
torture, physical pain “must be equivalent in intensity
to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such
as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even
death.”15 While these memos were eventually superseded,
policy changes were based only on domestic, rather than
international law.16 Such a shocking interpretation of
the law is possible only because the definition of torture
found within the UN CAT is not as strong as the
language used in the Third Geneva Conventions – which
allows no physical pain at all.17 The UN CAT defines
torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession.”18 However,
reading the language in such a narrow fashion confines
torture to only sadistic acts or deprivations, a reading
some have found to be incompatible with the purpose
of preventing torture.19 The torture memos stated that
the United States and the United Kingdom proposed
stronger language.20 However, they fail to note that a
majority of states rejected strengthening the language.21
Moreover, outside of armed conflict and
within the law enforcement paradigm, other important
limitations make up for, or otherwise limit, the use of
physical force far in advance the preposterous levels
suggested by the drafters of the torture memos. For
example, according to the Eighth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment
of Offenders, “[w]henever the lawful use of force . .
. is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall (a)
Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion
to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate
objective to be achieved; (b) Minimize damage and
injury, and respect and preserve human life; (c) Ensure
that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any
injured or affected persons at the earliest possible
moment.”22 The reasoning behind the use of the term
“severe” is far more comprehensible within the context
of law enforcement; of course law enforcement should
be allowed to use some physical force in detaining
or apprehending suspects and a bright-line rule
against any physical force would be detrimental to
law enforcement efforts – even within the context of
interrogations. Within the context of armed conflict,
however, this same type of reasoning does not hold.
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The practices used by the United States, including
several forms of deprivation, are nowhere found to be
legal in the travaux préparatoire of the UN CAT.23 Indeed,
in the Greek Case, which some commentators hold was
one of the main inspiration for the definition of torture
under Article One of the Convention,24 the court found
that “the failure of the Government of Greece to provide
food, water, heating in winter, proper washing facilities,
clothing, medical and dental care to prisoners constitutes
an ‘act’ of torture . . . .”25 The UN Commission Against
Torture has also often made specific findings of torture in
situations that did not include “severe” physical pain as
defined by the United States, but included factors such as
long hours of isolation, inadequate ventilation, cramped
rooms, and no light.26 It is under the backdrop of this
jurisprudence that the findings of the torture memos
become so shocking. For these reasons, the US is bound
not only by domestic law, but also by international law
and custom, to ensure that during armed conflict no form
of torture is administered to detainees.
B. The Applicability of International Human
Rights Law During Armed Conflict
The United States has argued that the UN
CAT does not apply during a situation of armed conflict,
because during a time of conflict, the law of war supersedes
international human rights law. According to the
Committee Against Torture, the United States has argued
that the law of armed conflict is the exclusive applicable
law.27 The Committee Against Torture has responded to
this argument by noting that the Convention applies at
all times, whether in peace, war, or armed conflict, in any
territory under its jurisdiction, and that the application
of the Convention’s provisions are without prejudice. The
Committee points to the wording of the Convention,
which stated that “[t]he provisions of this Convention
are without prejudice to the provisions of any other
international instrument or national law which prohibits
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of
which relates to extradition or expulsion.”28
The notion that human rights law, and thus the
UN CAT, apply during armed conflict is not novel. In its
2004 Legal Consequences on the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion, the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) found that IHL
and IHRL are co-extensive. In the words of the Court:
[T]he protection offered by human
rights conventions does not cease in
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case of armed conflict . . . . As regards
the relationship between international
humanitarian law and human rights
law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively
matters of international humanitarian
law; others may be exclusively matters
of human rights law; yet others may
be matters of both these branches of
international law.29
Thus, IHRL does not automatically cease to
be law as soon as armed conflict erupts. The question
of when a situation may be governed exclusively by
IHRL remains to be determined.
Some commentators have argued that
during an armed conflict, IHRL simply acts as a
sort of “benchmark” to IHL.30 However, this line of
reasoning does not incorporate the distinctly tripartite
test set out by the ICJ, generally considered to have
been established under customary conceptions of
international law.31 The analysis of when IHL applies,
rather, should be founded on the application of IHL
itself since it is the lex specialis.32
IHL and the use of force are guided almost
exclusively by the fundamental principles of warfare.
The first and founding principle is the principle of
military necessity. Military necessity requires states to
confine the use of force to military objectives only. It
was codified in the preamble to the Saint-Petersburg
declaration, which stated that “the only legitimate
object which States should endeavor to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy.”33 Christopher Greenwood, the British judge
of the ICJ, defines military necessity, in part, as a
belligerent applying “only that amount and kind
of force necessary to defeat the enemy.”34 In short,
military necessity is the only justification that may
abrogate human rights. The other three fundamental
principles, those of distinction, proportionality, and
humanity, act as a counter-balance to the principle of
military necessity.35 A state should only deviate from
IHRL when permitted by the principle of military
necessity. For example, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) guarantees the
right to life and freedom from the arbitrary deprivation
of life.36 Despite this, states are undoubtedly allowed
to kill combatants during warfare. Moreover, as long
as the principles of distinction, proportionality, and
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humanity have been adhered to, a state may also
legally deprive civilians of their lives (as, for example,
collateral damage in a drone strike). Thus, it is this type
of calculus with which foreign policy attorneys must
engage in order to determine when a treaty, particularly
one as important as the UN CAT, may be abrogated.
In the War on Terror, it seems entirely unlikely
that that the requirements of military necessity would
allow for the derogation of the freedom from torture
provided by the UN CAT. While part of the torture
memos’ argument is loosely based on the requirements
of necessity,37 this is regular necessity, related not to
military objectives, but to the protection of civilians.
Furthermore, even if there was some sort of military
necessity, the abrogation of the freedom from torture
cannot withstand the principle of humanity, which
finds that the ability of states to injure the enemy is
“not unlimited” and that states are prohibited from
“employ[ing] arms, projectiles, or material calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering.”38 Torture is always
unnecessary because it does not weaken enemy
forces nor constitute the force necessary to defeat the
enemy. Additionally, the suffering caused by torture
is immense. As one commentator explained, “pain is
just a useful method [during torture] for reducing the
individual to nothing more than a physical body; a
self that cannot make rational decisions or have any
concept of its own personality and individuality.”39 It
is for this reason that torture is viewed by almost all
states40 as a particularly serious offense that cannot be
justified by military necessity. Since the two sources of
international law are clearly co-extensive, and the law
of armed conflict under the principles of IHL do not
allow for the derogation of the general law in regards to
torture, the UN CAT applies during armed conflicts.
III. Armed Conflicts: Temporal Boundaries &
Political Rhetoric

A. Historical Significance of Temporal Boundaries
of Warfare
A temporal limitation on warfare is of
paramount importance for the law of war should never
obscure or obfuscate lex generalis, the law of peacetime,
during which no partial revocation of human rights is
permitted. Historically, the concept of spatial limitations
to warfare was taken for granted; war was always
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considered to have been temporally limited. Thus, the
wording of the Third Geneva Convention states that
detainees may be detained for as long as hostilities are
ongoing.41 The law of war is premised on compromise
and based on the notion that the fundamental human
rights of peacetime cannot be preserved during war.
It is the “special law” because it is well understood
that placing limits on warfare such as the prohibition
of killing would make the law unworkable. Thus, to
preserve international human rights law, the law of
war is allowed, within specific temporal constraints,
to derogate human rights for the purposes of waging
war. By dissolving the temporal boundary, however, we
allow the law of war to creep into the law of peacetime,
gradually dissolving fundamental rights.
This is precisely what has begun to occur
with the War on Terror targeting Al Qaeda and its
affiliates.42 The judicial branch of the United States
has consistently found that the War on Terror may be
not limited in a temporal way. For example, in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court refused to establish
temporal parameters for the conflict.43 In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the Court maintained that position.44 In
Justice Thomas’ dissent, he affirmed that the Court
should not and would not use time as a limiting
factor in assessing the scope of the conflict.45 These
decisions were made in the context of determining
whether or not detainees could be held indefinitely
(since detention is permitted only until the end of
hostilities). However, there is a more sinister effect
to the avoidance of a temporal limitation on warfare:
the dissolution of the temporal boundary of warfare,
combined with wartime rhetoric, has allowed the
executive branch to gain substantial latitude in using
force and diminish international human rights.
B. Political Rhetoric as a Weapon
In understanding how political rhetoric has
transformed, among other elements though perhaps
most saliently, the temporal boundary of warfare, we
must first turn to a general discussion on political
rhetoric. As one commentator correctly questioned,
“who is the enemy? If it is Al-Qaeda, how do we
identify a member of Al-Qaeda? Where does Al-Qaeda
operate? Do any sort of borders in fact confine AlQaeda? Are its self-professed affiliates also enemies?”46
However, we must first ask the question “why don’t
we care?” Why hasn’t there been a bigger backlash
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that would first attempt to define any of these terms
before sliding into an endless war paradigm? Political
rhetoric is, in large part, the answer to that question.47
Some of the more ardent detractors of the use of
political rhetoric to define warfare have categorized
political rhetoric as a form of terrorism that targets
civilians, generates fear, and causes political change.48
Terrorism is merely a term used to describe
a small subset of actions that fall within the larger
category of political violence.49 For political actors,
terrorism could be used to define and condemn any
actions of the enemy.50 It does not end with any
person, idea, or thing. Indeed, as initially defined
by Donald Rumsfeld, the US was at war with
“terrorism’s attack on our way of life.”51 The torture
memos, discussed in Section II, supra, often turned to
political rhetoric to justify many of their outlandish
claims regarding torture, scrupulously ensuring to “at
the outset, make clear the nature of the threat posed
. . . . ”52 Even though the present administration has
moved away from defining terror itself as the enemy,53
the notion that the United States is fighting terrorism
everywhere lingers. Declaring a war on a concept that
is too vague to be meaningful allows policy makers to
justify any global military activity.54 Its real effect is to
transform lex specialis into lex generalis. Armed with
this understanding of the power of political rhetoric,
it is easy to see how political rhetoric has changed the
temporal conception of warfare.
C. Political Rhetoric and the Dissolution of Time
The United States’ fixation with fighting
terrorism everywhere has led to the destruction of the
temporal element of warfare. This destruction, in turn,
has contributed to the abandonment of fundamental
guarantees of warfare found in the Geneva Conventions,
including freedom from torture. According to the
Third Geneva Convention, those detained by war are
to be tried for war crimes or released at the cessation
of hostilities “without delay.”55 Today, the guarantee
against indefinite detention is a jus cogens56 violation
of international law. The frequent violation of such
a guarantee contributes to the overall denigration of
detainees and is in this manner a foundation for other
violations, including torture. According to one scholar,
in the absence of traditional evaluations of warfare,
citizens “look to the leader for evaluation.”57 This is
because the erosion of clear temporal boundaries leads
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to a slippery slope that blurs the lines between war and
peace and obfuscates what is and is not legal. As some
commentators have concluded, this slippery slope
allows those in power to blur even the areas of the law
that remain relevant and clear, allowing war-makers
to mystify war to the degree necessary to turn obvious
legal conclusions – such as the prohibition of torture –
into disarray.58
The deferral to the leadership by the citizenry
is also of primary importance in stymieing resistance
to objectionable conduct such as torture. This has
become most salient, as noted earlier, in the judiciary’s
constant deferral to the executive in determining the
temporal boundaries or warfare. Phrased eloquently
by George Orwell in his classic 1984, “war, however,
is no longer the desperate, annihilating struggle that
it was in the early decades of the 20th century. It is
warfare of limited aims between combatants that are
unable to destroy one another, have no material cause
for fighting, and are not divided by any genuine
ideological difference.”59 Indeed, unlimited warmaking, as found in Orwell’s dystopian society, is a
terrifying interpretation of the war with no end being
waged against Al Qaeda, its affiliates.
IV. Armed Conflicts: Spatial Boundaries & Legal
Rhetoric

A. U.S. Conceptualization of Space and War
The application of the Geneva Conventions
must be fundamentally based in IHL. To sidestep the
application of the Geneva Conventions, then, the U.S.
primarily relies, rather calamitously, on a restricted
concept of the law of war. The first paradigm the
U.S. adopted was that there exists neither an IAC nor
a NIAC between the United States and individuals
belonging to Al Qaeda, but is still another sort of armed
conflict exempt from the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions.60 The U.S. Supreme Court eventually
rejected the dubious interpretation that the war against
Al Qaeda and its affiliates fell outside the purview of
both NIACs and IACs and found the proposed legal
justification that the war was a non-international
conflict of international scope to be unsatisfying.61 This
interpretation of international law is flawed because it
ignores the fundamental importance of a geographical
interpretation of the law.
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The framework used to combat terrorism
remains ambiguous today. Warfare has not traditionally
had explicit limits founded in geography. While IHL
does not explicitly delineate spatial boundaries to a
conflict,62 Common Article 2 and Common Article
3, governing the application of IACs and NIACs
respectively, take a geographical approach to armed
conflicts.63 For NIACs in particular, the reference to
location is quite evidently stated. Common Article 3
refers to conflict “occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties,”64 suggesting that the
state in which the conflict takes place forms at least part
of the geographic area of the conflict.65 IACs, however,
have not traditionally been seen to be geographically
limited; under IACs, wherever the enemy goes, “[a state
is] entitled to follow and attack him as a combatant.”66
However, an increasing number of advocates have
theorized that the concept of a “global” armed conflict,
even as it relates to IACs, runs contrary to international
law.67 Christopher Greenwood , a former ICJ judge,
stated that “it cannot be assumed – as in the past – that
a state engaged in an armed conflict is free to attack its
adversary anywhere in the area of war.”68 For example,
while Harold Koh and John Brennan have referenced
the targeted killing of Japanese General Yamamoto
during World War II as a justification for worldwide
targeted killings,69 some commentators have argued
that even the U.S. shooting down of Yamamoto’s plane
in World War II would today be illegal under IHL.70
While this notion is fiercely controversial,71
the United States has also demonstrated some
adherence to the importance of location in the use of
force. Significant judicial decisions have recognized the
principle distinction between areas falling within an
active theater of war and those falling outside of this
theater. Among them, in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, the Court
of Appeals for the DC Circuit distinguished between
Afghanistan, “a theater of active military combat,” and
areas outside of Afghanistan, considered “far removed
from any battlefield.”72 In Boumediene v. Bush, the US
Supreme Court recognized the territory of the United
States as not being within any “active theater of war.”73
B. Reinterpreting the Tadić Test
It is worth addressing, here, the Tadić armed
conflict test. The Tadić test, crafted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
to determine when armed conflict exists, has been
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embraced wholeheartedly by American policymakers for
finding that the United States is engaged in a NIAC with
Al Qaeda in which the bulk of the Geneva Conventions
do not apply.74 The Tadić decision holds tremendous
influence in determining where IHL applies.75 According
to that opinion, “an armed conflict exists whenever there
is a resort to armed force between States or protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within
a State.”76 However, the Tadić factors, which consist of
evaluating the intensity of the violence occurring as well
as the organization of the forces,77 have often been used
erroneously to argue that the United States is in a NIAC
with Al Qaeda since Al Qaeda is an organized armed
group fighting with significant intensity.78
Unfortunately, proponents of this mistaken
characterization fail to read the following sentence
of trial court’s decision, which stated that “in an
armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these
closely related criteria are used solely for the purpose,
as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict
from banditry . . . or terrorist activities, which are
not subject to IHL.”79 Thus, not only do the Tadić
factors apply exclusively in situations of internal or
mixed character,80 but the trial court specifically severs
terrorist activity from application of this test. Instead,
the Tadić test must be construed geographically if it
is to be understood correctly. Then, if the minimum
threshold of violence that defines an armed conflict is
satisfied, IHL should apply within that geographical
area. This is because the test does not purport to allow
a determination of the existence of a NIAC against
a terror organization or any transnational actor, but
an armed conflict within a confined geographical
space, regardless of that organization’s extraterritorial
affiliations. This interpretation is far more functional
with the reality that, unlike the irregular forces and
non-state actors noted in the Tadić decision, Al
Qaeda and its affiliates can shift “unpredictably and
irregularly between acts characteristic of wartime and
those characteristic of not-wartime.”81
C. Subsuming Al Qaeda within Armed Conflict
This brings us to the obvious question of how,
given the spatial requirement of warfare, the United
States could ever be at war with a transnational actor. The
simple answer is that it cannot, ever, be directly at war
with a transnational actor. However, there are three ways
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in which the U.S. can be engaged, indirectly, in an armed
conflict with Al Qaeda and other like organizations
without dispensing of the spatial requirement. All
three will be addressed, and a conclusion will be made
regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions.
First, states, through consent, internationalise an armed
conflict by joining with a state to fight armed groups
meeting the Tadić test within the consenting state.
Second, states may, while already engaged in an armed
conflict, attack or detain units in a neutral territory
under certain conditions. Finally, a state may invoke selfdefense and attack a state-sponsor of terrorism.
War may be waged against ‘transnational’
actors by joining national (that is, non-international)
armed conflicts. A state involved in a NIAC with an
armed group can consent to the use of force within
its territory by another state. Thus, if Pakistan was
engaged in a NIAC with terror groups within Pakistan,
the United States could lawfully be involved in the
conflict though Pakistan’s consent.82 The consenting
state is a necessary element of the existence of a NIAC
given the phrase “internal or mixed” noted earlier,
which logically makes “internal” a fundamental
component of the test. This internationalizes the
conflict, for the purposes of the Geneva Conventions,
between the intervening state and the armed group.
Legally, the right to attack units within a ‘neutral’
territory arises only when that territory is unwilling or
unable to neutralize belligerents. The offending state is
thus no longer neutral, but “non-belligerent,” and the
United States may violate that state’s sovereignty and
perform the defensive actions the neutral state should
have performed itself.83 However, this concept, codified
in the Hague Convention V and adopted in 1907,
was ratified in a time where states did not envision war
against a transnational actor. Arguably, this preventive
duty should not apply to transnational actors whose
actions in the neutral state are more akin to a private
person rather than leaders of a military operation, such
as employing terror tactics rather than waging war.84
Thus, it is more reasonable to find that the U.S. may
invoke this principle only if it is at war with a state (such
as Afghanistan) or in a NIAC within its own territory,
since, again, there must be an internal component.
The intervening state may also invoke selfdefense to attack the host state (implying statesponsoring of terrorism) and target hostile enemies.
The right to use force against the host state arises
when “the state is tightly interwoven with or otherwise
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exercises effective control over” an active group of
enemies within the host state.85 This is inferred from
the seminal Tadić Appeal Chamber “overall control”
test.86 Several ICJ decisions have also found that
the attacks of enemy groups must be attributable
to a state for an attack on that state’s territory to be
lawful. The ICJ has a different interpretation based
on a stricter “effective control” test, which the Court
used in several decisions. For example, in Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda,87 the ICJ found that Uganda could
not justify the use of force in Congo given that
Congo was not responsible for the attacks in Uganda
of non-state actor groups.88 In the Oil Platforms
case,89 the ICJ found that the US could not justify
its acts against Iran as self-defense because it had
not discharged its burden of proof to establish Iran’s
responsibility for attacks against the United States.90
In the Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua,91 it found that the
right to self-defense requires an armed attack by a
state or attributable to a state by “the sending by or
on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount
to (inter alia) an actual armed attack regular Armed
Forces, or its substantial involvement therein.”92
Since the use of force is per se an acknowledgement
of the existence of an armed conflict, the Geneva
Conventions must apply at all times to those ‘combat
zones’ in which individuals are killed or detained. Aside
from three exceptions noted earlier, there are no other
situations in which an armed conflict may arise between
a transnational force and a state. Thus, the Conventions
may not be regarded as optional or as a matter of ‘good
policy’ and the United States must apply the Geneva
Conventions within the geographical confines of combat
zones at all times. As such, any person detained within
a combat zone should be treated in accordance with the
norms of the law of armed conflict, regardless of who
they are. Of course, it is not always possible to determine
who is a combatant and who is a civilian, whether they
are engaged in hostilities or not. This dilemma will be
addressed in the following section.
IV. Al Qaeda: Belligerency and POW Status
Even when captured in a foreign territory,
members of Al Qaeda and its affiliates will virtually
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never qualify for POW status. It is important to
distinguish between the concept of a combatant
and the lawfulness of the combatant. Combatants
are those individuals who participate in hostilities.
Lawful combatants are those who fall under the
combatant status designation of the Third Geneva
Convention.93 Unlawful combatants are those who
do not. In designating Al Qaeda and its affiliates as
unlawful combatants, the United States, in its bid to
deny POW status to these detainees, has focused far
more on why Al Qaeda and its affiliates are unlawful
rather than why they are combatants at all.94 This
has contributed to notion of a ‘twilight zone’ in
the Geneva Conventions discussed in Section VI,
infra. The reality is that members of Al Qaeda, in
the absence of any other belligerent force, are not
combatants to begin with. There are two important
reasons for the US to deny Al Qaeda and its affiliates
the legal status required for POW treatment. First,
it unnecessarily endangers the rights of civilians and
exaggerates the scope of executive power. Second, it
glorifies the status of those criminals themselves who
are bestowed combatant status.
According to Article 4(a) of the Third Geneva
Convention, only members of the armed forces of a party
to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer
corps forming part of such armed forces qualify for POW
status.95 Members of other militias and volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a party to the conflict will only qualify if
they have the following characteristics: (a) that of being
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; and (d) that
of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.96 Al Qaeda and its affiliates, of
course, do not satisfy these qualifications – they are not
members of the armed forces of any state, nor do they
have a fixed, distinctive sign or carry arms openly. They
certainly do not conduct their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war because Al Qaeda is a
violent political organization that is not directly affiliated
with any nation-state.97 Failing to qualify for combatant
status means that they Al Qaeda’s members are not lawful
combatants – and a war without any lawful combatants
is, in reality, no war at all.
In situations of armed conflict, there is always a
risk that civilians directly participate in hostilities (DPH).
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It is these civilians who, for such time as they participate
in hostilities, are considered unlawful combatants (and do
not benefit from any combatant immunity).98 However,
a situation involving civilians who DPH can only arise
within the context of an already existing conflict – indeed,
it would be an intolerable feature of warfare to find that
a war can exist wherein one side of the conflict has no
lawful combatants at all. The war against Al Qaeda and its
affiliates is a war against civilians.
States have opposed broadening the scope
of combatant status to include terrorists because of
the risk it poses civilians. Indeed, while there are a
limited number of international treaties dealing with
terrorism, non-state actors are almost exclusively
regulated under national law. The most important
reason for not broadening the scope of combatant
status is that it would unnecessarily obfuscate the
distinction between civilians and combatants. In the
1980s, President Ronald Reagan strongly opposed
the provision of the First Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions which would have granted
combatant status “to irregular forces even if they do
not satisfy the traditional requirements” because “this
would endanger civilians among whom terrorists
and other irregular attempt to conceal themselves.”99
Reagan, of course, spoke here of awarding combatant’s
privilege, including POW status, and not being a
combatant per se. However, the argument remains
true regardless: civilian lives are certainly endangered
by over-broadening the meaning of “combatant”
to include terrorists who seek to blend in with the
civilian population, regardless of the status they are
awarded. Thus the United Kingdom understood the
First Additional Protocol to mean that “the term
‘armed conflict’ of itself and in its context denotes a
situation of a kind which is not constituted by the
commission of ordinary crimes including acts of
terrorism whether concerted or in isolation.”100
While the U.S. has chosen to include
terrorists as combatants in order to derogate their
rights, many states have chosen to avoid calling
terrorists combatants in order to delegitimize their
actions. Many states, including Spain, Portugal, the
United Kingdom, Indonesia, and Kenya, all use law
enforcement to combat terror threats against their
states. In fact, the United States, too, has traditionally
used a law enforcement paradigm instead of resortint
to armed conflict to combat terror and has employed
this in response to attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda
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in 1993, 1998, and 2000.101 Politically, war has
always meant a loss of control, while law enforcement
displays a firm grip on control.102 This is not simply
an act of political manipulation: while there are clear
legal benefits to the failure to recognize the enemy
as combatants, recognizing terrorists as combatants
give unwarranted legitimacy to their actions. This
notion has been well encapsulated by Christopher
Greenwood. According to Greenwood,
[i]n the language of international law
there is no legal basis for speaking of
a war on Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group, for such a group cannot
be a belligerent, it is merely a band of
criminals, and to treat it as anything
else risks distorting the law while giving that group a status which to some
implies a degree of legitimacy.103
Indeed, terrorism must be de-legitimized and
disassociated from lawful objectives. As Mary Ellen
O’Connor argues, “fostering healthy states through the
principle of non-intervention, the prohibition of force,
respect for proportionality in the use of coercion, and
promotion of human rights” through a global lawenforcement effort would be a far better policy towards
ending the threat of terrorism while still protecting
basic human rights.104 The Eminent Jurist Panel on
Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights
echoed this view in a 2009 report,105 which argued that
the current human rights legal framework is sufficiently
adaptable to combat any current or future threat.106
The report further concluded that even in the face of
“unprecedented” threats, the risk of temporary measures
becoming permanent, as well as the dissolution of
fundamental human rights, are too high a cost for the
derogation of human rights law to combat terrorism.107
V. The Myth of the Geneva Conventions’
Twilight Zone

A. Defining the Twilight Zone
Arising from the armed conflict paradigm is
another significant problem: the myth of a “twilight zone”
of the Geneva Conventions where those individuals
detained are neither civilians nor combatants, thus
making the Geneva Conventions inapplicable. Such a
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problem can ostensibly arise in two situations: within
an armed conflict against non-state actors (such as AlQaeda) and in armed conflicts against state actors where
non-state actors intervene as unlawful combatants (such
as the war in Afghanistan and within the border areas
of Pakistan). The former situation has already been
dispensed with: there can be no war with Al Qaeda
and its similar organizations for reasons of reasons of
spatiality, temporality, and belligerency.108 The following
section will thus deal with the latter situation.
The United States has made the assumption
that, during an armed conflict, those captured who do
not qualify for combatants’ privilege but who are still
belligerents fall under a “twilight zone” of the law whereby
neither IHRL nor the Geneva conventions apply to
them. Moreover, US has argued that it is not bound by
customary international law.109 Foremost, it should be
noted that even unlawful combatants, under Geneva
law, are given a fair trial and cannot be subjected to
coercive interrogation.110 There are quasi-legal (political)
arguments for the “twilight zone” status determination
made by the United States as well as legal reasons.
The political rationale is simple – terrorists will
not follow the rules laid out in the Geneva Conventions.
Thus, the United States would be placed at a significant
disadvantage if it had to follow these rules. International
law, this argument goes, is based on rational self-interest.
That is, states follow the rules of Geneva law based on
the understanding that other states will do so as well.
However, this argument is patently untrue, and may be
dispensed with quickly because he Geneva Conventions
do not have a “release clause” that relinquishes parties
from following the law because the other side engages
in illegal conduct (even if terrorists could be considered
belligerents under the law).
B. ICTY Jurisprudence: A Comparison
The Geneva Conventions do, however, have
a mechanism for determining the status of a detainee.
Found in the Third Geneva Convention, this is known as
a “status” or “Article 5” tribunal. These tribunals are meant
to be a temporary legal forum for determining the status
of an individual involved in a conflict. The ICTY has
had to deal with such situations in the internationalized
conflict of the Bosnian War. The Bosnian war was a
non-international conflict between Bosnian Serbs and
Bosniaks. Serbia and Croatia intervened in this conflict,
thus internationalizing it, much like the United States
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would internationalize a conflict by joining a NIAC.
In the context of the ICTY, based on a finding of
an internationalized armed conflict,111 the court has
been weary of finding individuals that do not clearly
meet the requirements set forth in Article 4(a) of the
Third Geneva Convention112 warranting combatant’s
privilege in relation to their detention. In Deladic, the
court recognized that categorization under Article 4(a)
sets rather stringent requirements for the achievement
of prisoner of war status, given it was drafted in light
of the experience of World War II and reflects the
conception of an international armed conflict current
at that time. Thus, the various categories of persons
who may be considered prisoners of war are narrowly
framed.113 A detaining power is required, under Article
5 of the Geneva Convention, to determine the status of
the person being detained (in an “Article 5 tribunal”),
and to impart on tat person the protections of the Third
Geneva Convention until a determination is made.114
An analysis of how the ICTY has chosen to
interpret customary international law in the context
of war crimes provides some interesting insight on
the understanding of customary law. Primarily, most
detention centers where violations occurred during
the Bosnian War were really “collection” centers and
comprised of both civilians and true prisoners of war.
This may indeed be similar to the American example.
In the Sikirica et. al. sentencing judgment,115 the court
found that investigations of the detaining power sought
to establish which detainees had been involved in the
fighting or where they came from and then categorize
the detainees based on their answers.116 However,
notwithstanding this procedure, the court still found
all detainees to fall under the category of “civilians,”
and based violations against them on the Fourth
Geneva Convention, noting that the aforementioned
method was an inadequate means of determining
the status of detainees.117 The United States currently
employs CSRTs (Combat Status Review Tribunals),
but the adequacy of such review boards remains to be
determined as they have yet to be legally tested.
The ICTY has been very careful in using the
term “detainees” rather than prisoners of war. Detainees
are not given combatant’s privilege, and thus violations
of IHL are violations under the Fourth, rather than the
Third, Geneva Convention. It is for similar reasons that
the United States continues to label those captured as
detainees. Given the ICTY’s narrow interpretation of
prisoners of war, and the Article 5 requirement noted
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above, the ICTY has also found that, notwithstanding the
complexity of distinguishing between them in detention
camps, all detainees are afforded the protection of either
the Third or Fourth Geneva Convention in regards to
detention. 118 Surprisingly, the court also found that
all detainees were protected under common Article 3
notwithstanding the requirement that those victims
take no part in active hostilities, because the chamber
was satisfied that “in the present case, the victims were
all civilians or prisoners of war, and as such were not or
no longer taking part in the hostilities.”119 In Prosecutor
v. Naletilic, the court held that, where there is doubt
between whether one is a prisoner of war or a civilian,
and since the application of the regime laid out in the
Third Geneva Convention is often more favorable to the
accused than the protection afforded to civilian detainees
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, it should apply
the lower standard relating to the labor of prisoners of
war as laid out in the Third Geneva Convention to all
detainees (since the Fourth Convention has a higher
standard relating to labor).120 The court stressed that
its opinion was predicated on the view that there is
no gap between the Third and the Fourth Geneva
Conventions. If an individual is not entitled to the
protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner of
war, he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of the
Fourth Convention, meaning that no person falls outside
the law.121 Thus, there cannot be a ‘twilight zone’ even
where individuals do not fit neatly into either status; at
the very least, the lower standard must always apply to
every person victimized by warfare.
VI. Conclusion
If torture is ever to be completely eradicated,
all states must adhere to several international principles.
First, where warfare begins, human rights do not end.
The UN CAT and other international agreements do not
simply cease in their entirety at the outbreak of warfare,
but continue to supplement those areas of the law left
ambiguous by the Law of Armed Conflict. Second, war
itself must be recognized as an abhorrent practice. If
the Geneva Conventions are always to be obeyed, the
notion of traditional warfare cannot be derogated from if
a state seeks to use force against any threat to its security
or existence. Thus, traditional notions of spatiality and
temporality must withstand the rise of new forms of
warfare. Members of transnational terrorist groups, while
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often vicious, insidious, and in need of neutralization,
may never make up a belligerent force with which a state
may go to war. Thus, the full scope of human rights
always applies to terrorists not participating directly in
a conflict. Nonetheless, when terrorists do participate
in armed conflicts, they do not forfeit their treatment
as human beings. As the jurisprudence indicates, they
are always afforded protection under either the Third or
Fourth Geneva Conventions.
As the United States has argued, this indeed
puts the United States, or any state combating the
new threat of international terrorism, at a strategic
disadvantage. However, through the adherence of such
principles, and the respect for the founding ideologies of
freedom and democracy, the sole path to victory against
those who seek to destroy these values is presented. As
one court noted, this is a plight unique to democracies;
“not all means are acceptable to it, and not all methods
employed by its enemies are open to it. Sometimes, a
democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its
back. Nonetheless, it has the upper hand. Preserving the
rule of law constitute[s] an important component of its
understanding of security.”122 The prohibition of torture
is a fundamental building block of modern civilization.
The values of this civilization should never get lost in
the furor and rhetoric of warfare; states should therefore
adhere to the restraints of the Geneva Conventions and
of the UN Convention Against Torture.

(Endnotes)
Samit is currently pursuing a joint degree at American
University’s School of International Service and the Washington
College of Law. During his time at American University, Samit has
pursued studies related to war crimes, international humanitarian
law, and the general intersection of international politics and the law.
2
See Hearing on Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Before the S. Armed
Servs. Comm., 108th Cong. (May 11, 2004); 2004 WL 1053885
(testimony of Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense
for Intelligence) (stating that the use of harsh interrogation
techniques were approved at the command level in Iraq).
3
Joshua Decker, Is the United States Bound by the Customary
International Law of Torture?, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 803, 806 (2005)
(recounting the assertions of one plaintiff whose right eardrum
had been ruptured by battery causing permanent deafness, and
of another who asserted he had endured sleep deprivation and
stones thrown at him as well as other detainees).
4
Dana Priest and Barton Hellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends
Interrogations; ‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held
in Secret Overseas Facilities, Wash Post A1 (Dec 26, 2002).
1

THE MODERN AMERICAN

Neil Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 30, 2004, at A1.
6
CIA Finally Admits to Waterboarding, The Australian,
Feb. 07, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/ciafinally-admits-to-waterboarding/story-e6frg6t6-1111115490483
(“General Michael Hayden’s comments before a Senate committee
yesterday were the first time a Bush administration official had
confirmed publicly that the CIA had subjected terror suspects to
waterboarding.”).
7
Sometimes also called the “Bybee memo,” drafted by
Assistant Deputy Attorney General John Yoo.
8
These memos can be accessed at http://www.aclu.org/
accountability/olc.html.
9
President Obama repudiated, in an executive order, the “torture
memos” permanently ending the overt use of torture by the United
States. See Executive Order: Interrogation, USA Today, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-01-22execorder-interrogation_N.htm (“All executive directives, orders, and
regulations inconsistent with this order, including but not limited
to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from
September 11, 2001, to January 20, 2009, concerning detention or
the interrogation of detained individuals, are revoked to the extent of
their inconsistency with this order.”).
10
Enhanced interrogation refers to the use of torture
during interrogations. See, e.g., The torture mystery; troubling
questions remain about how far the CIA can go with its ‘enhanced’
interrogation methods. L.A. Times, July 26 2007, http://articles.
latimes.com/2007/jul/26/opinion/ed-executive26.
11
The repudiation of the torture memo came with the
reasoning that torture is banned by domestic law. The revision
by the Office of Legal Counsel during the Obama administration
did not clarify in sufficient detail U.S. obligations under
international law. See Steven G. Bradbury, Memorandum for
the Files from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued
in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.
(Jan. 15, 2009) (“Federal prohibition on torture, 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A, is constitutional, and I believe it does apply as a
general matter to the subject of detention and interrogation of
detainees conducted pursuant to the President’s Commander
in Chief authority”). President Obama did, however, assure his
administration would comply “with the treaty obligations of the
United States, including the Geneva Conventions.” See Executive
Order: Interrogation, supra note 9.
12
Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture by the Bush
Administration, 136 (“the Secretary of Defense retains the right to
enact rules which permit coerced statements and hearsay evidence”).
13
Id. at 112.
14
Fatima Kola, Torture and Terorism: A Case Study 2007
Supplement UCL Jurisprudence Rev. 85, 90 (2007).
15
Decker, supra note 3 at 91
16
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17
The language of the Third Geneva Convention is much
stronger than the protection afforded under international human
rights law. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3316 art. 4, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
Art. 17 [hereinafter GC III] (“No physical or mental torture, nor
5

SUMMER 2013

any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war
to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners
of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or
exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind”).
18
The UN CAT also further defines torture as “punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions. See U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46, available at http://www.
un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm
19
Antonio Cassese, Are International Human Rights Treaties
and Customary Rules on Torture Binding Upon US Troops in Iraq? 2
J. Int’l Crim. Just. 827, 875 (2004).
20
Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President [hereinafter Torture
Memos] at 21 (“For example, the United States proposed that torture
be defined as ‘including any act by which extremely severe pain or
suffering . . . is deliberately and maliciously inflicted . . . . The United
Kingdom suggested an even more restrictive definition.”).
21
Curiously, while the U.S. filed an understanding of the
UN CAT that added a specific intent requirement for torture, in
2002 the U.S. representative to the Committee Against Torture,
Harold Koh, pointed out that in the view of the United States,
the U.S. understanding of the UN CAT “does not modify the
meaning of Article 1.” See Cassese, supra note 19, n. 12.
22
Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7
September 1990. available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
law/pdf/firearms.pdf. (emphasis added).
23
Manfred Nowak, What Practices Constitute Torture: US and
UN Standards, 28 Hum. Rts. Q. 809, 819 (2006).
24
Id.
25
The Greek Case, Y.B. Eur.Conv. on H.R. 461 (1969).
26
Nowak, supra note 23 at 828.
27
Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention Thirty-sixth
session ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CAT/Ć/USA/CO/2 (25 July 2006).
28
Id.
29
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), 2004 I.C.J. 136
¶ 106 (July 9).
30
See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights,
National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of
Terror, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 675, 752 (2004) (finding that by killing
terrorists, the United States should under human rights norms
bear the burden of demonstrating that those killings were neither
arbitrary nor unnecessary in concordance with the ICCPR).
31
Dominic McGoldrick, Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law in the UK Courts, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 527, 529 (2007) (“For
all but the diehards the principle of joint applicability is now
established international law.”).
32
Lex specialis refers to the “special law” of warfare, in
contradistinction to lex generalis, the general law of peacetime.

51

St. Petersburg Declaration, available at http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsf/FULL/130?OpenDocument.
34
Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and
Legal Basis, in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed
Conflicts, 1, 30 (Dieter Fleck ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
35
Distinction, proportionality, and humanity are all extracted
from international treaties and customary law. For a general
discussion these fundamental principles, see Marshall Cohen,
Taylor’s Conception of the Laws of War, 80 Yale L.J. 1492 (1970).
36
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/ccpr.htm. The ICCPR also explicitly permits states to
derogate from some of the rights laid out in the treaty, though
not the right to life, but only “[i]n time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which
is officially proclaimed.”
37
See torture memos, supra note 20 at 39.
38
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol.
T.S. 277, art. 22, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_
century/hague04.asp, art. 23.
39
Kola, supra note 14 at 89.
40
For a discussion on torture as an international peremptory
norm, see for example Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture
as an International Norm of jus cogens and Its Implications for
National and Customary Law, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 97, available at
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/1/97.full.pdf.
41
GC III, supra note 17, art. 4.
42
The Obama administration has since shifted from the
language of “war on terror” and used “War against Al Qaeda and
its Affiliates.”
43
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 520 (2004) (plurality opinion).
44
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); See also Joshua
Alexander Geltzer, Decisions Detained: The Courts’ Embrace of
Complexity in Guantainamo-Related Litigation 29 Berkeley J.
Int’l L. 94, 101 (2011) (finding that the Supreme Court has
consistently avoided finding a temporal basis for the war).
45
Id. at 685 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46
Danielle Jeffersis, Battlefield Borders, Threat Rhetoric, and
the Militarization of State and Local Law Enforcement, American
Univ. Nat’l Sec. L. Brief, forthcoming 12, available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125627.
47
Other commentators have chosen to call this “threat
rhetoric” or “collateral language.” While these certainly are
accurate formulations of the phrase, “political rhetoric” is a more
value neutral means of addressing the problem.
48
John Collins and Ross Glover, Introduction, in Collateral
Language (John Collins and Ross Glover, eds.), 2 (2002); See also
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors
Through a Global War on Terror?, 43 Colum. J. Transat’l L. 435, 446
(recognizing the tactic of using an unseen enemy to generate fear).
49
John Collins, Terrorism, in Collateral Language, 155,
165 (John Collins and Ross Glover, eds., 2002).
50
Id.
51
Donald Rumsfeld, A New Kind of War, N.Y. Times, Sept 21,
2001, A1.
52
Torture Memos, supra note 20, at 31.
33

52

See supra note 39 and accompanying text..
Ross Glover, The War on _, in Collateral Language, 207,
211 (John Collins and Ross Glover, eds., 2002).
55
Brooks, supra note 30 at 726.
56
Id.
57
Wojtek Mackiewicz Wolfe, Winning the War of Words 45 (2008).
58
See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 30 (finding that the erosion of
clear boundaries allowed lawyers for the Bush administration to go
from the legitimate legal conclusion that the Geneva Conventions
cannot easily apply to modern conflicts to the “disingenuous and
flawed” conclusion that there were therefore no legal constraints
on interrogation practices).
59
George Orwell, 1984 193 (Penguin Press ed. 1949)
(emphasis added).
60
See Torture Memos, supra note 20.
61
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (finding the
phrase “conflict not of an international character” in Common
Article 3 is used in contradistinction to a conflict between
nations, not between a state and a transnational actor).
62
Laurie Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary
Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the
Zone of Combat, 39 Ga. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 11 (2010).
63
Id. See also Brooks, supra note 30 at 725 (“The laws of
armed conflict traditionally conceptualize conflict as bounded
temporally as well as spatially.”).
64
See The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, T.I.A.S. No.3362,
at 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 art. 3.
65
Blank, supra note 62, at 11.
66
Kenneth Anderson, Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and
the Future of War, Written Testimony Submitted to Subcommittee
on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, US H.R. Subcommittee
Hearing, 111th Cong. 2nd sess. (2010). This determination is
limited solely to the Law of Armed Conflict. Important bodies of
international law not dealt with in this paper, including neutrality
law and sovereignty law would ostensibly limit, if not prohibit,
this legal authorization.
67
Human Rights Watch, supra note 64.
68
Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian
Law, in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts,
39, 53 (Dieter Fleck ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
69
Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote
Address at the American Society for International Law Annual
Meeting: The Obama Administration and International Law
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/
remarks/139119.htm; John Brennan, Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, The Ethics of Efficacy of the
President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), available
at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/
WilsonCenterFinalPrepared1.pdf.
70
Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism,
4 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 343, 361 (arguing that the targeted
killing of General Yamamoto would likely be in conflict with
U.N. Charter as well as the Geneva Conventions).
53
54

THE MODERN AMERICAN

Cf. Mary Ellen O’Connell. Id.; Michael Lewis, 47 Tex. Int’l
L. J. 293, 301 (2012) (“the claim that there are legal restrictions
on the employment of combat force during an international
armed conflict based solely upon the distance from the ‘front
lines’ finds no support in practice”).
72
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
73
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008).
74
Only Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
applies to NIACs as customary law (Additional Protocol II is also
applicable to signatory states).
75
This does not suggest that that Tadić decision has any
binding authority in international law.
76
Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment,
May 7 1998 at ¶¶ 561-62.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 65 (“ . . . I am certain of one
thing. We are at war . . . against a terrorist organization called AlQa’ida”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 44 at 631.
79
Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 76, at 562 (emphasis added.)
80
The war against a transnational entity lacks the internal
element required in the concept of a “mixed” character.
81
Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary
Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43 Colum. J. Transat’l
L. J. 1, 7 (2004).
82
This example is not intended to reflect the reality of the
situation in Pakistan regarding U.S. military activity and the
existence of Pakistani consent.
83
Robert Kolb and Richard Hyde, An Introduction to the
International Law of Armed Conflict 293 (2008).
84
Disputably, the actions of Al Qaeda and its affiliates thus fall
under actions of private persons which neutral powers have no
obligation to control in a law of war context. See id. (“[T]he state
had no duty to interfere with private action, even if that action was
contrary to the interests of a belligerent and would have been a
violation of neutrality if performed by state authorities themselves.”).
85
Matthew Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the
Law of War, 20 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 438 (2009).
86
This test is different from the Armed Conflict factor
tested noted earlier. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Judgement, para. 120 (July 15, 1999) (holding that acts of “armed
bands of irregulars or rebels” are attributable to a state when “the
group as a whole [is] under the overall control of the State”).
87
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J.
168 (Dec. 19).
88
Id., para.146-47.
89
Oil Platforms, 2003 ICJ 161 (Nov. 6).
90
Id., para. 51, 61.
91
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary activities in
and against Nicaragua, 1986 ICJ 14
92
Id., para. 195.
93
See GC III, supra note 17.
94
O’Connell, supra note 48 at 453.
95
GC III, supra note 17 art. 4.
96
Id.
97
Kola, supra 14 at 92.
98
The ICRC interprets the concept of directly participating
in hostilities in some detail. Civilians who DPH are targetable
71

SUMMER 2013

for “such time as they participate in hostilities”. The ICRC as
also defines a “continuous combat function” for those civilians
whose continuous function is to take part in hostilities, but even
under this definition, individuals who reintegrate into civilian
life are again considered civilians. See Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International
Humanitarian La 33-34 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/
eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.
99
Ronald Reagan, letter of Transmittal, The White House,
January 29, 1987, available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1987/012987b.htm.
100
O’Connell, supra note 70 at 348 (citing Understanding by
the United Kingdom to art. 1, ¶ 4 of AP I, available at http://
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC12564020
03FB6D2?OpenDocument).
101
O’Connell, supra note 70, at 347 (“After attacks by Al
Qaeda on American targets in 1993, 1998 and 2000, the United
States used the criminal law and law enforcement measures to
investigate, extradite, and try persons linked to the attacks.”).
102
Id.
103
Christopher Greenwood, War, Terrorism and International
Law, 56 Current Legal Problems 505, 529 (2004).
104
O’Connell, supra note 48 at 457.
105
Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging
Action (2009), available at http://www.ifj.org/assets/
docs/028/207/3e83f1c-fbfc2cf.pdf.
106
Id. at 24
107
Id. at 24-25; See Also O’Connell, supra note 48 at 457.
108
See Sections II, III, and IV, supra.
109
Decker, supra note 3 at 806.
110
Kola, supra note 14 at 93.
111
Based on the “overall control” test set forth in the
Tadić decision, the court has found that the conflict has been
internationalised by foreign control. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Naletilic,
IT-98-34-T (31 Mar. 2003) ¶ 196.
112
See GC III, art. 4, supra note 17.
113
Prosecutor v. Dedalic, IT-96-21-T (16 Nov. 1998) ¶ 267.
114
GC III, supra note 17, art. 5 (“Should any doubt arise as to
whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having
fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection
of the present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.”).
115
Prosecutor v. Sikirica et. al., IT-95-8-S (13 Nov. 2001).
116
Id. ¶ 83.
117
Id. It is also important to note that civilians can also be detained
(interned) if the security of the detaining power is involved and
makes detention “absolutely necessary”. Conceivably, all unlawful
combatants are detained under this provision. See Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 49,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 art. 42 [hereinafter GC IV].
118
Prosecutor v. Naletilic, supra note 3, ¶ 229.
119
Id.
120
Id., ¶ 252.
121
Id. ¶ 271.
122
Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 16, 148 (2002).

53

